Abstract-The cloud computing has recently emerged as compelling paradigm for managing and delivery services over the internet. However, users as well as critical infrastructure operators, have legitimate concerns about the confidentiality, integrity and availability, in short the dependability, of applications and their data hosted on a third-party cloud. The dependability is become a commercial imperative for cloud providers, especially to support cloud computing for critical infrastructures. In this paper the SecureCloud project, its approach and goals are presented. SecureCloud aims to remove technical impediments to dependable cloud computing, encouraging and enabling a greater uptake of cost-effective, environment-friendly, and innovative cloud solutions, in particular, for critical infrastructure applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Confidentiality, integrity, and availability of applications and their data are requirements that immediately concern to almost all organizations that use cloud computing. This is particularly true for organizations that must comply with strict confidentiality, availability and integrity policies, including those society's most Critical Infrastructures, such as finance, utilities, health care and smart grids. Dependability (which implies confidentiality, integrity, availability) has emerged as a commercial imperative for cloud providers to be able to support emerging markets as well as cloud computing for critical infrastructures or cloud robotics. The cloud has not only become a critical infrastructure itself but it needs to support other critical infrastructures. These include smart grids and systems in the health and transportation domains but also extend to future large-scale computing, such as the Internet of Things (IoT) and CyberPhysical Systems (CPS). The lack of sufficient dependability, however, is increasingly becoming the primary barrier to the broad adoption of cloud computing, not only in the critical infrastructure domain but also in all domains in which the survival of a company depends on the reliability of the cloud. Hence, the cloud becomes itself a critical infrastructure for which we need to guarantee adequate dependability such that we can justifiably place our trust in the hosted applications. The Cloud Industry Forum (CIF) [?] reports that data security and privacy -which are two important factors of dependability -are the top two concerns preventing the adoption of cloud computing in the United Kingdom. More in general, in Europe, the Steering Board of the European Cloud Partnership (ECP) identifies data protection and information security concerns as "the most ubiquitous requirements" for developing a trusted European cloud infrastructure [?] . In this context, the EU H2020 SecureCloud project (Secure Big Data Processing in Untrusted Cloud) proposes a innovative approach to ensure the dependability of critical applications that are executed in distributed, potentially untrusted cloud infrastructures. This innovative approach leverages the emergence of a new and promising technology -secure commodity CPUs -which promises to enable a new generation of dependable applications by basing trust in hardware mechanisms offered by commodity CPUs, in particular, Intel's Secure Guard eXtensions (SGX) [?] . This permits applications to be isolated not only from other applications in the cloud, but also from the underlying operating system and the hypervisor. It allows users to run their sensitive applications in a public cloud without the need to unconditionally trust the cloud provider. Moreover, to facilitatethe usage applications with high or very high security requirements, SecureCloud will integrate and extend the most popular technologies (i.e OpenStack, Secure Container, Coordination Service and Software-Defined Networks(SDN)) of last years to ensure the dependability of cloud applications. The paper is organised as follow: Section 2 provides a project overview, the proposed approach and its goals. In Section 3 the fundamentals of SGX technology is discussed. A real use case and an attack scenario through which will demonstrate the potentiality of SecureCloud approach are presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper with final remarks.
II. SECURECLOUD OVERVIEW
SecureCloud project focuses on a particularly important domain: applications that support critical infrastructures. If one can trust a cloud to run applications in the context of critical infrastructures, one can clearly trust this cloud to run applications in a large variety of application domains.
The area of interest of the project is the smart grids domain. Smart grid applications offer the opportunities to consider many of the requirements that a sensitive big data applications may have when executing in the cloud. First, smart grid applications deal with a growing volume of data. Smart meters and sensors for monitoring distribution and transmission grids are being deployed and are capable of continuously collecting and transmitting data. Adequate use of this data enables energy distributors not only to optimise their infrastructure, but also to reduce the environmental impact of supplying power to a given load or region. Second, these promising data analysis require to have access to detailed information about energy consumption. This data represents a big privacy risk because it can be used to accurately profile consumers activities and behaviors. Finally, when applications consider the data and decide to react to it, this reaction would interfere with the physical world. If an adversary compromises such actuating applications, the actuation could have devastating effects on the power system. In stark contrast to traditional throughput-oriented, batchprocessing cloud applications, applications in the critical infrastructure domain do not only have strong requirements with respect to confidentiality, integrity, availability, but they typically are also latency sensitive. Secure storage of sensitive data in untrusted clouds is widely regarded as a solved problem [?] [?]. However, the secure and efficient processing of sensitive data in untrusted cloud is an open issue for securing cloud computing. SecureCloud approach leverages and extends the following technologies:
• Intel SGX as root of application trust to provide confidentiality and integrity of sensitive data. SGX isolates the memory content of protected applications to prevent the operating system or the hypervisor from being able to read and/or modify application data.
• OpenStack as a common cloud stack infrastructure.
• Container technology to allow the execution of Intel SGX secure enclaves inside containers.
• Coordination Service to detect a computer or an application process failure and restart either the application process on a different computer or a newly created virtual machine, or the container depending on the requirements of the application process.
• Software-Defined Networks(SDN) to connect the application components within data centres as well as across data centres. Also, existing approaches using SGX try to execute legacy applications together with a library operating system inside an enclave [?] . This leads to a large trusted computing base, where trusted computing base refers to the software and hardware parts that has to be trust to achieve one's security goals. In contrast, SecureCloud goal is to minimise the trusted computing base to include only the pure application logic. As a consequence, we will not primarily support the secure execution of legacy applications but focus on supporting modern distributed applications that are based on micro-services. To minimise the size of the trusted computing base, an application is split in a set of micro-services. The application logic of each micro-service lives within an enclave, while the micro-service run-time lives outside of the enclaves. These run-time functions only access encrypted data, e.g., runtime functions send or receive encrypted data. Figure ? ? depicts the overall architecture of SecureCloud. As shown, an application consists of a set of micro-services connected via an event bus. All messages on the event bus are encrypted: encryption and decryption is performed automatically within enclaves. Decryption keys are stored securely with enclaves only. All the micro-services need to be able to communicate with external clients and services.
For security reasons, we will only support HTTPS-based micro-services. The usage of HTTPS has lots of practical advantages. In the context of SecureCloud, we will need to terminate the TLS connections within an enclave, which means that not only the TLS but also the HTTP processing would have to be done within the enclave. Another interesting solution proposed by SecureCloud is the use of container frameworks, such as Docker [?] , for the application running on cloud instead of traditional virtual machines. Containers are more efficient than virtual machine (reduced starting time and smaller overhead) and the security risks are mitigated combining containers with SGX enclaves. However, to be compliant with the well known virtualisation technologies, the use of virtual machine is supported.
III. INTEL SGX TECHNOLOGY: BASIC CONCEPTS
The SecureCloud platform enables secure processing and the dependability of on-cloud critical applications exploiting the Intel's Secure Guard eXtensions (SGX) as key technology. SGX aims at solving the so called "secure remote computation" problem. This problem deals with the execution of applications on a remote host owned and maintained by an untrusted party. The solution proposed by Intel leverages trusted hardware (i.e. the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)) in the remote computer. The SGX extensions are introduced with the 6th generation Intel core processors "Skylake" to protect selected code, data and sensitive processing from disclosure and modification. These extensions allow programs to allocate protected regions of execution in memory, known as secure enclaves, isolating application's secrets from external world and privileged software, such as kernel and hypervisor. The access to the secure enclaves is regulated by security mechanisms enforced by the CPU. The information stored within an enclave (sensitive data and the code that processes it) are protected by the SGX that identifies and enables the applications that can execute it. Only trusted applications can access to the enclave, without having to trust the environment that hosted them. To do this, the SGX supports the software attestation feature which proves the reliability of a chunk of code running in an enclave. The attestation process convinces an enclave that it is communicating with another enclave that it is running in a secure container and also, that has not been altered. This mutual verification between the enclaves is enforced using processor key which is accessible only by a specific enclaves, called "Quoting Enclave". Given that, two applications could reside in the same or different machine and SGX supports both an intra-attestation and an inter-attestation procedure. The inter-attestation provides a secure channel between two remote enclaves by using a key exchange protocol, which the Diffie-Hellman protocol [?] is an example. Of course, the high security provided by the SGX technology has a cost both in performance (the verification of reliable enclaves has a non-negligible impact on the performance) and for the restricted set of operations that an application can do in an enclave (the system calls are not allowed). These limitations must be addressed by a careful design of the SGX-enabled applications, choosing appropriately what can be stored within the enclave and what can be outside of them.
IV. SMART HOMES APPLICATION USE CASE
As mentioned in Section ??, in order to validate and demonstrate the need and the feasibility of using secure clouds, the SecureCloud project considers use cases in the area of smart grids. Smart grid applications offer the opportunities to consider many of the requirements that a sensitive big data applications may have when executing in the cloud. One of these use cases involves the collection of power consumption data from a residential user. The cloudification of smart home applications is a promising solution in terms of benefits for the society. However, migrating house energy management information to the cloud poses stringent security requirements to applications. Once this data is under control of an energy provider, an adversary could compromise this data, or a malicious employee could gain access to them. Data loss, data breach, data corruption, and Denial of Service (DoS) are the main risks to be considered if sensitive data are moved to a cloud-based infrastructure. Therefore, the data gathered from the on field sensors, especially their confidentiality, has to be protected. Also, a secure data storage and a reliable communication between smart meters and applications is necessary. Given the above requirements, is been defined the design of a Smart Homes application composed by several micro-services. Figure ? ? shows the Smart Homes application micro-services and their integration with SecureCloud platform. In the following, an exhaustive list of the micro-services concerning the Smart Homes application is reported:
• Data Collector is the micro-service responsible for acquiring and forwarding data retrieved by the sensors toward other application micro-services.
• Alarm Manager is the micro-service responsible to spot alarms or critical conditions. • SQL Archive to store historical data into a SQL database.
• Access Controller is the micro-service that performs the Identity Access Management (IAM) of the application users.
• Web Proxy is the micro-service that provides data coming from the Smart Homes application back-end to the front-end dashboard.
• Dashboard GUI is a web-based Human Machine Interface (HMI) for analysing historical data and detecting possible anomalous patterns. The GUI must establish a secure channel with the Web Proxy micro-service in order to protect the visualisation of the measurements.
Each micro-service will be executed in a distinct secure container and a secure event bus (i.e. ZeroMQ [?] ) is been selected to guarantee a secure message exchange between 
A. Attack scenario
An application for acquiring, processing and storing data coming from a smart home represents an interesting target for a cyberattack. The interest dramatically increases when these applications use cloud-based infrastructure. This means that sensitive data, as well as its processing, is at risk. Therefore, the Smart Homes application use case will demonstrate how the SecureCloud approach mitigates this risk. Two fundamental security mechanisms will be shown. On one hand, the data acquired from the smart home sensors will be analysed in order to detect anomalous activities. The detection of an anomalous situation can be an indicator of a cyber or a real world attack. On the other hand, the system which executes this anomaly detection has to be secure itself. In order to show how the system can be implemented in a secure way the scenario focuses on a specific type of attack, named Iago attack [?] . The Iago attack consists in the mounting of a malicious kernel on the node where the target application runs. The malicious kernel runs at higher privileges on the processor, and can perform a cyberattack on the target application by reading application secrets from the memory or manipulating data. A malicious user can execute a Iago attack against the cloud machine where the anomaly detection application runs violating the integrity and confidentiality of data processed and stored in that machine. Security measures against Iago attacks have been investigated and presented in [?] , where a paraverification technique that enforces the untrusted operating system to participate in its own verification is proposed. A different approach has been presented in [?] , where a user-provided token returned by the operating system allows to verify that newly memory mapped regions do not overlap the old ones. The proposed attack scenario will demonstrate how the enhanced security technologies implemented in the SecureCloud platform thwart this type of threat. In particular, the SecureCloud SGX-enabled architecture will protect the memory contents stored in the enclaves from the malicious operating system and the use of ZeroMQ as event bus, combined with its security protocol, will prevent message breach during the communication among the enclaves.
V. CONCLUSION SecureCloud will clearly make one step forward in the dependability of critical applications executed in potentially untrusted cloud infrastructures. To reach this meaningful goal, the SecureCloud approach combines secure CPU hardware in commodity processors and a trusted computing base. The integration of SecureCloud platform features into a standard cloud stack will encourage easy migration of critical, as well as non-critical applications, to the cloud without compromising application dependability. As a result, this project will contribute for influencing the standards and best practices to remove the barrier to the broad adoption of cloud computing in the critical infrastructure domain. The ease of adoption, in combination with the cost fairness of the cloud model, will enable enterprises or individual users, to create and deploy secure data-processing applications in the cloud.
